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Why Care About the History of
Women in the Legal Profession?
Mary L. Clark*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, I was invited to the Supreme
Court to give a talk about the history of wo-
men's Supreme Court advocacy. In preparing
my remarks, I was conscious of the dangers as-
sociated with "compensatory" history, the term
used to describe the first telling of marginalized
peoples' histories, which have tended toward
unnuanced celebrations of hitherto unknown,
but unblemished, exceptional figures. The
problem with compensatory history is that it too
often amounts to hagiography - a worshipful or
idealizing biography.' As Barbara Babcock, a
leading writer about the history of women in
the legal profession, has quipped, "we must put
the hag back into hagiography"2 by presenting
women's history in its fullness, warts and all,
and not simply as a glowing account of great,
first women.
With cautious regard for the need for nu-
ance in telling this "first" history, I unearthed
information on who had presented argument,
with what professional affiliations, in what types
of cases, tracking whether these patterns have
changed in the 125 years since women were first
admitted to the Supreme Court bar. I
researched whether the cases in which women
were involved raised concerns of particular in-
terest to women and, if so, how the advocates
framed the issues. Likewise, I looked at
whether the women's styles of advocacy had
been distinctive in any way. On Supreme Court
litigation, I examined the influence of non-law-
yer women and women lawyers who were not
members of the Supreme Court bar. Finally, I
compared and contrasted the history of women
as Supreme Court advocates with that of wo-
men as Supreme Court clerks, looking to how
these two histories intersected and might have
influenced one another.'
In this article, I tackle the broader ques-
tion: "why care about the history of women in
the Supreme Court bar specifically and in the
legal profession generally?" Included in that
question are considerations of the following: (1)
what theoretical frameworks are useful for eval-
uating the significance of women's service in the
Supreme Court bar and (2) how does the his-
tory of women in the Supreme Court bar and in
the larger profession fit in to the broader his-
tory of women?
*Mary L. Clark is an Assistant Professor of Law at
American University Washington College of Law, teaching
Property, Legal Ethics, and seminars on Women's Legal
History/History of Women in the Legal Profession and
Feminist Jurisprudence. Prior to coming to WCL, Clark was
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where she conducted research on the history of women at
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1. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE EN-
GLISH LANGUAGE (Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed. 2000),
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=hagiog-
raphy (defining "hagiography").
2. Barbara Babcock, Foreword: A Real Revolution, 49 U.
KAN. L. REV. 719, 726 (2001).
3. The results of my research are set forth in Mary L.
Clark, Women as Supreme Court Advocates, 1879-1979, 30 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 47 (2005).
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I will begin with a sketch of the history of
women's advocacy before the Court and then
turn to these broader questions. I will conclude
with thoughts on the evolving historiography of
women's history.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN AS
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES
In 1879, following years of active lobbying
by Belva Lockwood and her associates, Con-
gress amended the rules of the Supreme Court
bar to provide for the admission of women and
admitted Lockwood as the first female member
that same year.4 Despite the fact that most of
the earliest women Supreme Court advocates
(from 1879 to the turn of the twentieth century)
were active suffragists, ironically they were not
involved in cases regarding women's rights
before the Supreme Court.5 Bradwell v. Illi-
nois,6 the most significant women's rights case
of the time, was briefed and argued by men in
1873, six years before the first woman was ad-
mitted to the Court. The types of cases in
which the earliest women members appeared -
such as contract and property disputes - were
typical of the small practices with which they
were affiliated. Many female attorneys served
as solo practitioners or were in practice with
their husbands, predominately representing
male clients.7
In the first several decades of the twentieth
century, the number of women active in the Su-
preme Court bar grew slowly, principally as
government attorneys at the local, state, and na-
tional levels.8 Having gained their professional
opportunities through public service, their
achievements modeled possibilities for other
women considering careers in public service
and/or careers in the law. One stand-out of this
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period was Mabel Walker Willebrandt of the
Justice Department who participated in twenty-
two cases argued on the merits in an eight-year
period between 1921 and 1929, and personally
argued ten of them.9 Like the earliest women
advocates, however, no one in this second wave
litigated women's rights claims before the
Court.
Thereafter, two of the most prominent fe-
male high court advocates of the 1960s and
1970s were affiliated with non-profit civil rights
advocacy groups: Constance Baker Motley at
the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People Legal Defense Fund
(NAACP LDF) and Ruth Bader Ginsburg at
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Women's Rights Project. Motley argued ten
race discrimination cases before the Court be-
tween 1961 and 1964, winning nine of them,1"
while Ginsburg briefed and argued the leading
women's rights cases of the 1970s as Director of
the Women's Rights Project.
Today, women advocates in the Supreme
Court are affiliated in roughly equal measure
with government agencies, non-profit advocacy
groups, and law schools. Very few women ad-
vocates have been affiliated with the leading
law firms, consistent with the history of women
in the legal profession generally. Two notable
exceptions are Beth Brinkmann of Morrison
and Foerster, LLP and Maureen Mahoney of
Latham and Watkins, LLP, who each got their
start with the Solicitor General's office before
moving to private practice. In contrast with his-
torical patterns, a growing number of women
advocates have argued feminist causes before
the Court, pressing for expanded recognition of
sexual harassment, family leave rights and gay
4. Lockwood was the first woman to argue before the Su-
preme Court, in Kaiser v. Stickney, 26 L.Ed. 176 (1880),
where she sought to use a married woman's legally disadvan-
taged status with respect to property-holding to disavow the
wife's transfer of property to a third party. Lockwood was
unsuccessful in Kaiser; the Court held that the transfer was
authorized by the husband and the wife. Leila J. Robinson,
LL.B., Women Lawyers in the United States, 2 GREEN BAG
10, 27 (Horace W. Fuller, Ed. 1890) (on file with the author).
5. Indeed, suffragette Susan B. Anthony sued for the right
of women to vote, unsuccessfully arguing the supremacy of
national citizenship over state citizenship, in United States v.
Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459).
However, United States Circuit Judge Ward Hunt made sure
her case never reached the Supreme Court. ELLEN CAROL
DUBOIS, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 105,113
(1998).
6. 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
7. Robinson, supra note 4, at 11, 14.
8. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Bessie Margolin, and Bea-
trice Rosenberg are the stand-outs in this era.
9. See Clark, Women as Supreme Court Advocates, supra
note 3 at 52 n.36.
10. The one adverse ruling, regarding race-based preemp-
tive strikes in jury constitution, was overturned by the
Court's subsequent decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986). See Clark, Women as Supreme Court Advocates,
supra note 3 at 55 nn. 74-76.
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rights. Overall, women have comprised eight
percent of Supreme Court advocates."
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WOMEN'S
PARTICIPATION AS SUPREME
COURT ADVOCATES
Though the generalizability of women's ex-
periences in the Supreme Court is limited, given
the small number of participants, there are
some important insights to gain from studying
women's experiences in what, for many lawyers,
is the high point of their professional lives - ar-
guing before the Supreme Court.
On a symbolic (and potentially actual)
level, arguing before the Supreme Court means
being the ultimate lawyer, the ultimate gen-
tleman and, even, the ultimate warrior.1 " The
importance of the forum for making a mark on
history cannot be overestimated, with the great
advocates, such as Daniel Webster, Charles
Hamilton Houston, and Thurgood Marshall,
powerfully shaping the law, as well as the pub-
lic's and the profession's understanding of what
it means to be a lawyer. Because women have
been excluded from public-speaking opportuni-
ties until very recently in historic terms, there is
a powerful symbolic force associated with their
courtroom advocacy, especially at the meta-
level of the Supreme Court. 3 Their speech is,
in effect, amplified. Moreover, in a profession
that inextricably links the Supreme Court with
authority, at least in the public's mind, that wo-
men could assert that authority is a powerfully
symbolic and fundamentally challenging act. In
cases where women argued for a feminist cause,
which became increasingly common in the final
quarter of the twentieth century, the signifi-
cance of women's participation was that much
greater. No longer must women ask men to
plead their causes, instead, women would em-
power themselves by stating their own cases.
Historian Michael Grossberg, in Meanings
for Manhood,'" has done a particularly deft job
of teasing out the ways in which the legal pro-
fession institutionalizes masculinity. As Gross-
berg observes:
[T]he law was not just one more occu-
pation; it was a distinctive endeavor
with a special place and power in the
republic. And there came to be em-
bedded in American legal conscious-
ness an underlying premise that de-
creed the bar a masculine domain.
Indeed, masculinity was so fundamen-
tal to the profession's consciousness
that for most of the century it acted as
an unarticulated first principle. 5
Grossberg concludes, "[t]he nineteenth-
century bar was a man's profession, masculinity
a baseline of professional consciousness and
community membership. Masculine values
helped define the place of the lawyer in Ameri-
can society and legitimated his power by mak-
ing it seem natural and preordained."16 Women
arguing cases in the Supreme Court then tread
on the ultimate domain of responsible man-
hood. It is a fundamentally challenging act. In-
deed, "[t]he general reaction of male lawyers
[to women's participation] appears to have
been one of disbelief, coupled at times with
'horror and disgust.'17
11. See, e.g., Clark, Women as Supreme Court Advocates,
supra note 3.
12. The notion of being the "ultimate warrior" because
you have argued before the Supreme Court is supported by
references to the military in Supreme Court literature. See,
e.g., Kenneth Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice:
Sadie TM. Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women
into the American Legal Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2002) (citing Michael Grossberg in ob-
serving, "[u]ntil women were admitted to the profession,
courtrooms were battlefields where men engaged in forensic
warfare in front of all-male juries and judiciaries.").
13. For example, Belva Lockwood, who would go on to
surmount women's exclusion from the Supreme Court bar,
was prohibited from speaking on behalf of her clients in the
U.S. Court of Claims by Chief Judge Charles Drake who de-
clared unequivocally, "Madam, women do not speak in this
court. You will sit down." Michael Grossberg, Institutional-
izing Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine Profession, in
MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD: CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULIN-
ITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 147 (Mark C. Carnes & Clyde
Griffen, eds., 1990).
14. Id. at 146-47.
15. Id. at 134.
16. Id. at 150.
17. Id. at 145-46. When the Supreme Court justices were
first confronted with women's demands for admission to the
legal profession, Justice Bradley, in concurring in the judg-
ment in Bradwell v. Illinois, railed against the impropriety,
indeed the impossibility, of women's participation:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa-
tions of civil life. . . .The paramount destiny and mission
of women was to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother.
83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873).
IV. FRAMEWORKS FOR CONSIDERING
WHY IT MATTERS THAT WOMEN
HAVE SERVED AS SUPREME
COURT ADVOCATES
In addressing the question of "why it mat-
ters" that women have served, and continue to
serve, as advocates before the Court, I have
generated a half-dozen hypotheses: (1) that wo-
men's participation is important (regardless of
impact on case outcomes) because there must
be equality of opportunity and freedom from
discrimination in gaining appointment to argue
cases before the Court ("equality/anti-discrimi-
nation" hypothesis); (2) that having women par-
ticipate in the Supreme Court process promotes
public trust and confidence that justice will be
done by furthering the perceived legitimacy of
the system through its greater reflectiveness of
the diversity of the American people ("legiti-
macy/representativeness" hypothesis); (3) that
it is important to have "insiders" in the Court
who can advocate for the woman "outsider"
perspective ("insider/outsider" hypothesis); (4)
that women's participation at the highest levels
of the profession is important in shattering ste-
reotypes and modeling possibilities for both
current and future generations ("educative/in-
spirational" hypothesis); (5) that women advo-
cates bring different styles of advocacy and/or
viewpoints than men to the Court ("difference"
hypothesis); and (6) that the absence of women
in positions of power, including as advocates
before the Court, is symptomatic of men's dom-
inance of women in our society and must be ac-
tively countered ("dominance/anti-subordina-
tion" hypothesis).
These hypotheses are neither mutually ex-
clusive, nor exhaustive, of potential explana-
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tions for the significance of women's participa-
tion in the Supreme Court process. They are,
however, representative of the major classes of
arguments developed within feminist theory
and feminist legal theory.
1. Equality/Anti-Discrimination
The equality/anti-discrimination hypothesis
suggests that it is important in and of itself that
appointments to argue cases before the Court
are characterized by equality of opportunity, re-
gardless of potential impact on outcomes. This
entails not only the removal of formal barriers
to participation by women, as achieved by
Belva Lockwood's lobbying for an amendment
to the Supreme Court bar membership rules to
permit women's admission, but also changes in
the norms of participation that have historically
favored men, including the informal systems of
winning appointments to represent clients in
the High Court, modes of dress,"8 and dominant
styles of argumentation.1 9
Faith in equality and anti-discrimination
principles in shaping women's opportunities is
not without its detractors. As Wendy Brown
observes in Politics Out of History, "[u]nder-
mined by historical as well as intellectual events
in the late Twentieth Century, the seamlessly
egalitarian social whole constituting liberalism's
vision of the future now appears problematic
both theoretically and practically., 20 In light of
the compromised nature of formal equality
goals for women in the legal profession, femi-
nist legal theorists and advocates have looked
elsewhere than to the equality/anti-discrimina-
tion rubric for their arguments as to the signifi-
cance of women's participation.
18. The accepted uniform for those presenting argument
on behalf of the Solicitor General's office has long been the
dark gray morning coat. It was no small matter of concern
when women first joined the ranks of the SG's office in the
1970s as to what the analogous female uniform should be.
Some women created morning coats to fit smaller frames and
to be worn with skirts, while others chose to wear alternative,
but still conservative, dark suits. This issue of appropriate
dress for women lawyers is not a new one, where the Equity
Club letters (a correspondence society of women lawyers,
many of whom were graduates of the University of Michigan
Law School, who exchanged advice about practice and bal-
ancing work/family conflict, among other issues) of the 1870s
and 1880s took up the question of whether women lawyers
should wear hats in court, where a hat was an essential ele-
ment of a modest woman's dress, but were forbidden in court
for lawyers. The consensus was that women lawyers should
wear hats in court. The interest in covering, or suppressing,
female sexuality (where absence of a hat signaled loose or
fallen status) trumped the traditional decorum of the court-
room. Today, women sporting anything other than a dark
conservative skirt suit in the Supreme Court is rare and has
drawn the attention of the former Chief Justice himself. See,
e.g., Legal Times re: Brinkmann (on file with the author).
19. Sally J. Kenney, Breaking the Silence: Gender Main-
streaming and the European Judiciary, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUDIES 250, 257-70 (2002), available at http://eucenter.wisc.
edu/Conferences/Gender/genderpapers.htm (last visited Nov.
6, 2005).
20. WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY 20
(2001).
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2. Legitimacy/Representativeness
Another idea to which theorists and advo-
cates have turned in addressing the significance
of women's participation is that of legitimacy
and/or representativeness. There are a number
of ideas embedded here, including the impor-
tance of having players in the judicial process
who reflect the diversity of the public, and, in so
doing, promote public trust and confidence that
justice will be done.
This representativeness argument risks the
dangers of essentialism in claiming that women
as a group are "X." To counter this danger, em-
phasis must be given to recognizing the varying
demographics, experiences, and perspectives of
women."' Managed thoughtfully, the represen-
tativeness argument is an important element of
other hypotheses regarding the importance of
women's advocacy before the Supreme Court:
insider/outsider, educative/inspirational, differ-
ence, and dominance/anti-subordination, which
follow.
3. Insider/Outsider
In "Where is Gender in Agenda Setting?"
political scientist Sally Kenney recognizes the
importance to women, as historic "outsiders to
power," of having well-placed "insiders" pro-
moting women's concerns within established ve-
nues." This analysis applies with particular
force to advocacy before the Court, where some
women oralists over time have taken on the
mantle of "insiders," gaining credibility in argu-
ing before the Court. By gaining the Justices'
trust, the women advocates can use it to benefit
"outsider" women.
4. Educative/Inspirational
This hypothesis is premised on an under-
standing that women's participation at the high-
est level of the profession is important for shat-
tering stereotypes regarding women's abilities
and modeling possibilities of women's achieve-
ments for present and future generations.
5. Difference
The difference hypothesis anticipates that
different styles of advocacy, viewpoints, and/or
outcomes may be associated with women's in-
creased participation in the judicial process, in-
cluding at the Supreme Court level. To the ex-
tent women employ different manners of
participation, there is the potential such partici-
pation will challenge our understanding of what
good lawyering is and potentially reshape cul-
tural norms. Of equal importance, to the extent
women's advocacy brings something different
to the table in terms of viewpoints, it has the
potential for reshaping our understanding of
what the law should be, producing different
substantive outcomes.
Whether premised on biology, biography,
or both, there is less evidence of women model-
ing a different style of advocacy, and more evi-
dence of women bringing a different set of is-
sues to the table, changing the shape of the law
through their participation. As with the repre-
sentativeness hypothesis, difference theory risks
essentializing all women as "X," failing to ac-
knowledge the important differences among
women, necessitating care in applying this hy-
pothesis.
6. Dominance/Anti-Subordination
As the principal architect of dominance/
anti-subordination theory, Catharine MacKin-
non argues that the legal profession has been,
and continues to be, defined by male norms and
that widespread acceptance of these norms
serve men's, especially powerful men's, inter-
ests in dominating and subordinating women.23
Ostensibly value-free rules, standards, and
viewpoints promote men's interests because
these "norms" were defined by and for men.
For MacKinnon, genuine change will come only
with radical reconstitution of accepted social
norms.
21. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the In-
tersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of An-
tidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Kimberle Cren-
shaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241
(1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
22. Sally Kenney, Where is Gender in Agenda Setting?
25:1/2 WOMEN & POL. 179 (2003).
23. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 40-41 (1987).
V. WHY STUDY THE HISTORY OF
WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION?
Why does it matter that we preserve, ex-
amine, and/or publish the history of women as
Supreme Court advocates specifically, and the
history of women in the legal profession gener-
ally? Are we doing something more than
merely preserving, examining, and/or publish-
ing when we do so? And how does this particu-
lar history fit into the larger women's history as
a field of inquiry?
In considering these questions, I looked to
work done by a range of women's historians, in-
cluding women's legal historians. The histori-
ography (or analysis of the history) of women's
history identifies four distinct stages in the
evolution of that field: (1) compensatory his-
tory, which sought to redress women's omission
from the traditional history narrative, (2) con-
tributory history, which sought to make, or re-
cord, women's contribution to male-defined so-
ciety; (3) the "new" social history, which began
to focus on everyday private life that was never
previously valued as an element of traditional
history; and, most recently, (4) the history of
gender as a contested construct, in which we
find ourselves. Each of these stages, as one
commentator has noted, was "more complex
and sophisticated than the last, but all useful
and necessary.,
24
I will flesh out each of these stages in turn
before taking up the question of the significance
of pursuing the history of women in the legal
profession.
1. Compensatory History
Compensatory history, as the first stage of
women's history, sought to redress women's in-
visibility in the traditionally accepted history
narrative. Women's compensatory history took
24. Jane Sherron De Hart and Linda K. Kerber, INTRO-
DUCTION: Gender and the New Women's History, in Wo-
MEN'S AMERICA: REFOCUSING THE PAST 3, 4-5 (Linda Ker-
ber & Jane De Hart, eds., 5th ed. 2000).
25. Id.
26. NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, 1607-1950: A Bio-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Edward T. James, Janet Wilson
James & Paul Boyer eds., 1971); ILENE KANTROR & HAR-
RIETTE WALKER, NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN: THE MOD-
ERN PERIOD (Barbara Sicherman & Carol Hurd Green eds.,
1980).
27. See, e.g., THE CHALLENGE OF FEMINIST BIOGRAPHY:
WRITING THE LIVES OF MODERN AMERICAN WOMEN 4
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an additive approach to history, for example,
"add women and mix," but did not substan-
tively challenge the established narrative's focus
on "great" actors in politics, military, science,
the arts, etc. Rather, compensatory history's in-
itial focus on great women fit neatly with tradi-
tional history's focus on great men.
It is not surprising to find that women's
compensatory history crested with the second
wave of the Women's Movement in the late
1960s and early 1970s. One understandable
impulse towards compensatory history was the
desire to make manifest the significant achieve-
ments of previously ignored peoples, and, in do-
ing so, to empower them. First published in
three volumes in 1971 as an encyclopedic his-
toric survey of more than 1800 women, the No-
table American Women series is exemplary of
this approach to women's history.26
As noted earlier, the most serious short-
coming of compensatory history is its un-ambiv-
alent celebration of great women. Ambiguities
and conflicts are not addressed, but, rather,
elided. Compensatory history's failure to ac-
knowledge flaws in its "heroes" or "pioneers"
was in part symptomatic of a too-close identifi-
cation between historian and subject. Much of
this first stage of women's history took the form
of biography, and a close, uncritical relationship
often developed between biographer and sub-
ject. In pursuing the lives of great women,
women's historians were also pursuing their
own senses of self-worth and self-identity. For
many women's historians, this was a journey of
self-discovery and self-empowerment. Com-
pensatory history, as such, was in many ways a
consciousness-raising exercise.
Barbara Babcock has written of her close
identification with Clara Foltz, about whom she
has written extensively, where Foltz was the
first woman public defender in California, and
(Sara Alpern, Joyce Antlon, Elisabeth Perry, & Ingrid
Scobie, eds., 1992) (stating that "[i]n its earliest days biogra-
phy had been at the center of the modern women's history
movement. In order to rescue from historical oblivion the
women who had been agents of change or articulate critics
and leaders of their culture and society, the first generation
of modern women's historians had spent years restoring to
the record the deeds and accomplishments of 'notable' wo-
men. But in the mid-1970s, such work, by that time called
'compensatory,' moved out to the margins.").
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Babcock, the first chief of the Washington, D.C.
Public Defender Service.28 Babcock highlights
the risks of too close identification with one's
subject, a closeness she feared might inhibit full
exposition of Foltz's racism towards Chinese
Americans, for example. Addressing the temp-
tation to exaggerate a female subject's accom-
plishments in the face of women's historic
marginalization, Babcock writes:
Recognizing the huge difficulties the
pioneer women faced raises a second
temptation toward biographic exag-
geration. We have a sense of being on
a rescue mission to save these women,
who suffered so much, from their pre-
sent oblivion. This leads to a certain
gloss, to relating the upbeat stories
without the dark sides.2 9
Fighting that instinct in her work, Babcock in-
stead "tell[s] the students, and tr[ies] to enact in
my own work, [that] we must reveal the flaws,
failings, and losses as well as the triumphs. Oth-
erwise, we will not fully understand the achieve-
ment of these first women."3
Not only does compensatory history give a
potentially exaggerated, uni-dimensional
celebratory history of women, but the focus on
great women "does not tell us much about
those activities in which most women engaged,
nor does it tell us about the significance of wo-
men's activities to society as a whole."'" As
Gerda Lerner has observed, "[t]he history of
notable women is the history of exceptional,
even deviant women, and does not describe the
experience and history of the mass of wo-
men."32 What is missing is "an awareness of
class differences in history: women of different
classes have different historical experiences. To
comprehend the full complexity of society at a
given stage of its development, it is essential to
take account of such differences., 33 Such dif-
ferences were recognized only with a movement
to include a broader swath of women in a sec-
ond, "contributory," stage of women's history.
2. Contributory History
No longer limited to the narratives of a few
great women, contributory history charted "wo-
men's contribution to their status in, and their
oppression by, male-defined society,"34 asking
questions such as, "what have women contrib-
uted to abolition, to reform, to the Progressive
movement, to the labor movement, to the New
Deal?"35 Its method was to foreground the
movement or event in question and ask what
women had contributed to it. As Lerner ob-
serves, "the contribution is judged first of all
with respect to its effect on that movement and
secondly by standards appropriate to men.",
3 6
While contributory history was important
in bringing women more fully into the history's
"story," it, like compensatory history, was lim-
ited in ambition. It did not seek to challenge or
alter the accepted parameters of the traditional
history narrative. Rather, it merely sought to
"add" women, as with compensatory history, al-
beit a broader sweep of women. Again Lerner
notes, "historians of women's history have so
far used a traditional conceptual framework.
Essentially, they have applied questions from
traditional history to women, and tried to fit
women's past into the empty spaces of historical
scholarship., 37 The limitations of such work are
obvious - "it deals with women in male-de-
fined society and tries to fit them into the cate-
gories and value systems which consider man
the measure of significance. Perhaps it would
be useful to refer to this level of work as 'transi-
tional women's history,' seeing it as an inevita-
ble step in the development of new criteria and
concepts., 38 In the face of contributory his-
tory's shortcomings, Lerner declares, "[t]o any-
one seriously concerned with the implication of
[this] research ... it is clear that we need a re-
definition of historical categories and historical
significance.31
Offering a slightly different take on the sig-
nificance of contributory history, Joan Scott
writes:
28. Babcock, supra note 2, at 725-27.
29. Id. at 726.
30. Id. at 725-27.
31. GERDA LERNER, THE MAJORITY FINDS ITS PAST 115-
16 (Oxford University Press 1979).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 116.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Lerner, supra note 31, at 116.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 140.
The titles of some of the major books
of that period - Becoming Visible,
Hidden from History - reveal [a] pre-
occupation with making women evi-
dent to readers of historical accounts.
By recovering stories of women's ac-
tivism, feminists provided not just new
information about women's behavior,
but new knowledge - another way of
understanding, of seeing, women, and
another way of seeing and understand-
ing what counted as history.40
Thus, for Scott, women's contributory his-
tory had a real transformative potential. Never-
theless, one of contributory history's central
flaws is that, "[i]t is beset by a version of the
'sameness versus difference' conundrum that
feminists have long faced as they argued for
equality with men. Feminist historians have
made the identity of 'women' coherent and sin-
gular at the same time that they have provided
empirical evidence for irreducible differences
among women."4 " More complex, nuanced un-
derstandings of women's lives would come with
women's history's third stage, the so-called
"new" social history.
3. THE "NEW" SOCIAL HISTORY
In this third stage, women's historians be-
gan to focus on everyday private life, which had
never before been valued in traditional history.
The new scholarship questioned basic assump-
tions, including the periodization of history by
military and/or other political events.4 2 Instead,
the new social history looked, in part, to life cy-
cles for its organizing principles.43 Additionally,
40. Joan W. Scott, Introduction, in FEMINISM AND His-
TORY 3 (Joan W. Scott ed., 1996).
41. Id.
42. Lerner, supra note 31 at 122 (noting, "[w]omen's his-
tory presents a challenge to the periodization of traditional
history. The periods in which basic changes occur in society
and which historians have commonly regarded as turning
points for all historical development are not necessarily the
same for men as for women. This is not surprising when we
consider that the traditional time frame in history has been
derived from political history. Women have been the one
group in history longest excluded from political power and
they have, by and large, been excluded from military deci-
sion-making. Thus the irrelevance of periodization based on
military and political developments to their historical experi-
ence should have been predictable.").
43. See, e.g., THE CHALLENGE supra note 27 at 5 (noting,
"practitioners of the genre [could] apply a more feminist ap-
proach to women's lives, using the new feminist scholarship
in literature, psychology, and anthropology. Such an ap-
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it re-conceptualized history by including multi-
ple, intersecting, and previously invisible per-
spectives, including concern for class and race,
as well as gender.44
Lerner characterized the transition from
contributory history to the new social history as
follows:
Slowly, as the field has matured, his-
torians of women's history have be-
come dissatisfied with old questions
and old methods, and have come up
with new ways of approaching histori-
cal material. They have, for example,
begun to ask about the actual experi-
ence of women in the past. This is ob-
viously different from a description of
the condition of women written from
the perspective of male sources, and
leads one to the use of women's let-
ters, diaries, autobiographies, and oral
history sources.4 5
Of central importance to this third stage of
women's history is the "shift from male-ori-
ented to female-oriented consciousness," pro-
ducing "challenging new interpretations" of
past events and/or phenomena.46 For example,
"[h]istorians of women's history have studied
female sexuality and its regulation from the fe-
male point of view, making imaginative use of
such sources as medical textbooks, diaries, and
case histories of hospital patients."4 7
Lerner calls this new social history a "wo-
man-oriented" history because it asks questions
of history appropriate to women that had not
previously been asked. Lerner posits that it is
specifically because of the failure to ask ques-
proach would allow biographers to use life-cycle analysis or
to address topics most biographies seldom touch on, such as
how women's private and public lives intersect, the impact of
mother-daughter relationships, or the familial and female
friendship support networks that sustained women's public
activities.").
44. Lerner, supra note 31 at 126 (observing, "[t]he first
stage of 'transitional history' may be to add some new cate-
gories to the general categories by which historians organize
their material: sexuality, reproduction, the link between
childbearing and childrearing; role indoctrination; sexual val-
ues and myths; female consciousness. Further, all of these
need to be analyzed, taking factors of race, class, ethnicity,
and, possibly religion into consideration. What we have here
is not a single framework for dealing with women in history,
but new questions to all of history.").
45. Id. at 121-22 (emphasis omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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tions of history appropriate to women that wo-
men have been hidden from view in traditional
history. As Lerner puts it:
Women have been left out of history
not because of the evil conspiracies of
men in general or male historians in
particular, but because we have con-
sidered history only in male-centered
terms. We have missed women and
their activities, because we have asked
questions of history which are inap-
propriate to women."
Lerner advocates the following corrective:
"[t]o rectify this and to light up areas of histori-
cal darkness we must, for a time, focus on a wo-
man-centered inquiry, considering the possibil-
ity of the existence of a female culture within
the general culture shared by men and wo-
men."49 For Lerner, the primary task of wo-
men's history is to ask, "[w]hat would history be
like if it were seen through the eyes of women
and ordered by values they define?"5 Only in
this way could the development of a feminist
consciousness be fully recognized and under-
stood.
Highlighting the potential for the new so-
cial history's focus on "gender" to "fundamen-
tally transform disciplinary paradigms," Scott
has declared, "it is not too much to suggest that
however hesitant the actual beginnings, such a
methodology implies not only a new history of
women, but also a new history. The way in
which this new history would both include and
account for women's experience rested on the
extent to which gender could be developed as a
category of analysis."51 Like Lerner, Scott un-
derscored the urgency of understanding histori-
cal events and/or phenomena along intersecting
axes of race, gender, and class.52
Ultimately, the gender consciousness of the
new social history offered the possibility not
only for a woman-oriented history, but for a re-
conceptualized men's and women's history, cen-
tering gender as an organizing principle. Thus:
The gender consciousness a feminist
biographer brings to a female subject
can enrich biographies of male sub-
jects as well. Few biographies of men
highlight gender issues in men's lives.
They generally focus instead on a
man's preparation for and fulfillment
of his life course in the public arena.
A heightened gender consciousness
would help biographers explore the
constraints by which society forces
men into certain molds of behavior. It
would not ignore, or dismiss as irrele-
vant, a man's private life or the nature
of his family and work relations with
individuals of both sexes.
5 3
Nancy Cott underscores the importance of gen-
der consciousness in pursuing history today,
whether labeled as "women's" or "men's" his-
tory: "[g]ender matters because the disparate
situations of the sexes cause them to experience
or perceive events or circumstances differently.
The differences, similarities, and overlap be-
tween men's and women's experiences and
viewpoints must be systematically investigated
if we are to understand the fullness of human
culture, development, and society."54
This heightened gender consciousness pro-
duced a fourth stage in women's history, in
which many of today's historians situate them-
selves, examining historical phenomena through
an understanding of gender as a contested con-
struct.
4. HISTORY OF GENDER AS A
CONTESTED CONSTRUCT
Scott frames the critical questions in this
fourth stage as, "How does gender work in
human social relationships? How does gender
give meaning to the organization and percep-
tion of historical knowledge?" and asserts that,
"[t]he answers depend on gender as an analytic
category."55 At the same time, this fourth stage
presents the most complexly intersectional un-
48. Id. at 140.
49. Id.
50. Lerner, supra note 31 at 140-41.
51. Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical
Analysis, in FEMINISM AND HISTORY 152, 154 (Joan W. Scott,
ed., 1996) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 153-54 (noting "[a[n interest in class, race, and
gender signaled, first, a scholar's commitment to a history
that included stories of the oppressed and an analysis of the
meaning and nature of their oppression and, second, schol-
arly understanding that inequalities of power are organized
along at least three axes.").
53. THE CHALLENGE, supra note 27, at 7-8.
54. Nancy Cott, "On Men's History and Women's His-
tory," in MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD: CONSTRUCTIONS OF
MASCULINITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 205 (Mark C. Carnes
& Clyde Griffen, eds., 1990).
55. Scott, supra note 51 at 155.
derstanding of the impact of gender, race, and
class on individual lives.
Scott highlights the transferability of this
method of gender analysis to other modes of in-
quiry, noting:
The sketch I have offered of the pro-
cess of constructing gender relation-
ships could be used to discuss class,
race, ethnicity, or, for that matter, any
social process. My point was to clarify
and specify how one needs to think
about the effect of gender in social and
institutional relationships, because this
thinking is often not done precisely or
systematically.56
Scott goes on to declare that "gender is a pri-
mary way of signifying relationships of power.
It might be better to say, gender is a primary
field within which, or by means of which, power
is articulated.,
57
An understanding of gender as a social
construct, and site of power, is critical to under-
standing the importance of women's advocacy
in the Supreme Court.
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Where then does my history of women's
Supreme Court advocacy fit within the evolving
story of women's history? While I resist the
compensatory element with its temptation of
unreflective celebration, I also believe that un-
covering and preserving the stories of great, but
previously unrecognized women is a necessary,
and important, step in women's empowerment.
Historian Ellen Carol DuBois gives credence to
the feminist impulse to ground the struggle for
equality in a greater understanding of the past:
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Activists committed to social change
need to create for themselves a histori-
cal interpretation which can take them
from one kind of past to a different
kind of future. Moreover, this need
for history takes on different forms
during different stages in a move-
ment's development: sometimes the
purpose of history is to inspire, some-
times to sustain, sometimes to recall.58
Kathryn Kish Sklar observes in a related fash-
ion, "A group without a history is a group with-
out an identity. By creating a history of women,
historians do more than reconstruct the past in
new ways. They transform the possibilities in
women's present and future."59
Thus, my history is:
" part compensatory ("there were (and
are) women here");
" part contributory ("here's how women
fit in to the established historical narra-
tive");
* part social history ("what else was go-
ing on in the lives of these women ad-
vocates and in the lives of women gen-
erally at this time?"); and
" part history of gender as a contested
construct ("how to define cases raising
concerns of interest to women? On
what basis are we saying that certain
cases relate to women's interests, and
others don't?").
Each of these histories therefore contrib-
utes to a better understanding of the roles and
experiences of women in the Supreme Court
bar, specifically, and in the legal profession gen-
erally.
56. Id. at 169.
57. Id. at 159. Elsewhere, Scott concludes:
the discipline of history, through its practices, produces
(rather than gathers or reflects) knowledge about the
past generally and, inevitably, about sexual difference as
well. In that way, history operates as a particular kind of
cultural institution endorsing and announcing construc-
tions of gender. A relativized concept of gender as his-
torically specific knowledge about sexual difference al-
lows feminists to forge a double-edged analytic tool that
offers a way to generate new knowledge about women
and sexual difference and to inspire critical 5challenges
to the politics of history, or for that matter, any other
discipline. Feminist history then becomes not just an at-
tempt to correct or supplement an incomplete record of
the past but a way of critically understanding how his-
tory operates as a site of the production of gender
knowledge.
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59. THE CHALLENGE, supra note 27 at 21.
